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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation addresses two research questions:   
1. Do states misrepresent their progress on their own state assessments? 
2.  If states do distort their progress, are their predictors to suggest why this 
distortion occurs? 
 The first research question requires that distortion be defined.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation I calculated the growth from 2003 to 2005, 2005 to 2007, and 2007 to 
2009 on each state‟s individual state assessment and the NAEP.  To calculate the growth 
I used a modified growth equation that subtracts the two scores and divides that by the 
maximum score on that test in that year, from the first score.  This calculation produces a 
Practical Normed Growth (PNG) for the state assessment as well as the NAEP.  To 
determine the distortion index I subtract the NAEP‟s PNG from the state assessment‟s 
PNG.  A positive distortion index indicates the state assessment‟s growth was greater 
than the NAEP‟s growth and the state distorted their progress.  A negative distortion 
index indicates the NAEP‟s PNG was greater than the state assessment‟s PNG and the 
state did not misrepresent their progress.  This analysis was done on the elementary 
reading assessment.  This assessment includes three growth periods to compare, creates 
three observations of the 50 states, or 150 data points possible for distortion.   
 The first research question, do states distort their progress?  The answer is yes.  
On the elementary reading assessments the states had a positive distortion index 76 times 
out of a possible 150, or 51%.  The observed distortions came from three basic models.  
First, the state assessment scores went up, but the NAEP scores went down or stayed the 
same.  Second, the state assessment scores stayed the same, but the NAEP scores went 
down.  Third, the state assessment scores went down, but the NAEP scores went down 
more.  In each of these possible scenarios the states have misrepresented the education 
progress of their state to their stakeholders.  In the first scenario, if the scores on the state 
assessments go up while the NAEP assessment scores go down indicates a narrowed 
curriculum and an overemphasis on the state assessment.  In the second scenario, if the 
scores on the state assessment stayed the same while the NAEP scores dropped indicates 
a less effective focus on the state assessment, at the expense of the NAEP.  The third 
scenario, both the state assessment and NAEP scores fall, with the NAEP scores falling 
faster indicates a state struggling to do anything well.   
 The second research question, are there predictors to suggest why this distortion 
occurs?  The answer is yes.  On the elementary reading assessment comparison, two 
predictors were statistically significant in the final model, state population and African-
American status.  The coefficients of each of these predictors indicate that states with 
lower populations and higher numbers of African-Americans distort their progress more 
on the elementary reading assessments.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose for this Study 
 In 1965 Lyndon Johnson declared a “War on Poverty” which began the high 
stakes testing era.  By providing schools with additional funds to combat the effects of 
poverty, and the states accepting those “title” funds, the groundwork was established for 
a culture built on standardized assessments.  In 1969 the reauthorization The Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) established the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) to assess the impact of the title funds distributed in 1965, 
starting a snowball that would culminate 47 years later in the 2002 reauthorization of 
ESEA, better known as No Child Left Behind.   
 In 1976, social science researcher Donald Campbell developed what is known as 
Campbell‟s Law which states, “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for 
social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor” 
(Nichols & Berliner, 2007).  In President Johnson‟s “War on Poverty” the social decision 
was made to provide funding for students that need additional resources, coupled with the 
No Child Left Behind policy of assigning the quantitative measure of test scores to 
remain eligible for those funds, has led to resource dependency, institutionalism, and a 
high stakes culture.  School districts are resource dependent and controlled externally, 
making the ceremonial adoption of policies and procedures necessary to maintain their 
legitimacy and funding.  Deviations from this new norm threaten their existence and 
further raise the importance of the state assessments perpetuating a high stakes culture 
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that links resources to results by any means necessary, which has manifested itself in the 
need for some schools, districts, and states to distort their progress.   
 In this dissertation I will examine the distortions that occurs at the state level as a 
result of a high stakes testing culture.  Distortions, for the purposes of this dissertation, 
will be defined as the magnitude of the discrepancy between the reported levels of growth 
the state reports on its own high stakes state assessment, compared to the rate of growth 
on a low stakes assessment, the National Assessment of Educational Progress, NAEP.   
 This study seeks to provide some predictors to suggest possible explanations to 
why these distortions occur using census data obtained through the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series (IPUMS).  Other studies have compared state assessment scores and 
NAEP scores in snapshots to illustrate the rigor of standards used for the state assessment 
(McLaughlin, Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, Chaney, Esra, Hikawa, Rojas, William, 
and Wolman, 2008) and to highlight the achievement gap that occurs between groups of 
students (Lee and Reeves, 2012), but none have examined the inflated levels of 
proficiency reported over time with the integration of census data to try to tell the story as 
to why it occurs.  This pattern of inflated reported gains in educational progress, intended 
to boost confidence in the process and protect resources, could hinder real progress from 
occurring.  The accurate collection and reporting of achievement data influences the 
decisions policymakers need to make to improve quality of education in this country.  
When that data is not reflective of the current state of education it potentially creates a 
false sense of security to allow existing practices to continue.  The purpose of using data 
in the decision making process is to allow for informed judgment by those leaders 
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charged with making policies.  When the data is manipulated or misrepresented, it 
inhibits true progress from occurring.   
1.2 Research Questions 
This dissertation addresses two research questions:   
1. Do states misrepresent their progress on their own state assessments? 
2.  If states do distort their progress, are their predictors to suggest why this 
distortion occurs? 
 The first research question requires that distortion be defined.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation I calculated the growth from 2003 to 2005, 2005 to 2007, and 2007 to 
2009 on each state‟s individual state assessment and the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress, NAEP.  To calculate the growth I used a modified growth equation 
that subtracts the two scores and divides that by the maximum score on that test in that 
year, from the first score.  This calculation produces a Practical Normed Growth (PNG) 
for the state assessment as well as the NAEP.  To determine the distortion index I 
subtract the NAEP‟s PNG from the state assessment‟s PNG.  A positive distortion index 
indicates the state assessment‟s growth was greater than the NAEP‟s growth and the state 
cheated.  A negative distortions index indicates the NAEP‟s PNG was greater than the 
state assessment‟s PNG and the state did not distort their progress.  This analysis was 
done on the elementary reading assessment.  This assessments had three growth periods 
to compare, creates three observations of the 50 states, or 150 data points possible for 
cheating.   
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 The second research question of this dissertation is to suggest some predictors to 
suggest why these distortions occur.  Using state level data from the United States Census 
and IPUMS, a fixed effects time variant panel regression model was created to determine 
if any of the following eight variables were statistically significant when compared to the 
calculated distortion index; per pupil expenditure spent on education, state population, 
manufacturing level of the state, parent‟s level of education, poverty status of the home, 
father‟s location in the home, African-American status of the state, and born in the United 
States to suggest possible relationships.   
 This study will examine distortion indexes for elementary reading from 2003 to 
2009 to answer the two research questions.  The amount of distortion that occurs on each 
test will be examined, and well as the predictors that proved to be statistically significant.   
1.3 Significance of the Study 
 This study is important because it examines state level distortions in a new way.  
Other research has been done with similar data to look at the rigor of state standards and 
achievement gap analysis, but none of that research has addressed why states have 
allowed the standards to become less rigorous or why groups of students achieve at 
different levels.  Much of the research focuses on what is happening, this study seeks to 
suggest why it is happening.  By coupling the testing data with predictors outside of 
education it allows for a sociological approach to a societal issue.  The issues we have in 
education cannot be fixed by a different system of education.  Until these issues are 
examined as symptoms of our society, rather than a stand-alone system that operates in 
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isolation, we are doomed to the same frustrations that have plagued educators since the 
dawn of public schooling.   
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
2.1 Research Question 
1. Do states misrepresent their progress on their own state assessments? 
2.  If states do distort their progress, are their predictors to suggest why this 
distortion occurs? 
This dissertation compares each state‟s individual state assessment to the NAEP to 
determine a distortion index.  The states with similar distortion indexes will be grouped 
together and census data will be used to explore various state characteristics to suggest 
possible predictors these distortion levels.  To this end, this dissertation relies on a 
number of key literatures; cheating in education and cheating in formal organizations.  
The organizational sociology theories of institutionalism and resource dependency 
provide a framework to review the applicable research to understand why formal 
organizations; including schools, school districts, and states would ceremonially adopt 
polies and procedures while distorting their progress to maintain their legitimacy.  The 
study also draws on the discussion of motivations to distort progress in a high stakes 
versus a low stakes environment.  This literature provides a disciplinary framework to 
address the discrepancies in student performance explored in this dissertation.   
 The fundamental contribution of this study is to education policy literature on the 
potential downside of high stakes policy.  Although the literature is limited, there is 
growing interest around policy scholars on the disadvantages of high stakes testing, 
which is also reviewed below.   
2.2 - Distortions in Organizations – Institutionalism and Resource Dependency 
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 Cheating occurs in all formal organizations.  Bureaucracies enabled on 
quantifiable outcomes lead to risk evasion and cheating (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Any 
institution, business, or organization has one primary goal, to survive.  According to 
Meyer and Rowan an organization will avoid risks and cheat if needed to survive.  
Institutions adopt “rationalized myths” to ceremonially adopt practices to appear 
legitimate in hopes of achieving similar results with competing schools.  This ceremonial 
compliance at the state level manifests itself in the creation of state standards, state 
assessments, and cut scores that are necessary to meet the timeline set by the federal 
government.  The spirit of complete competency is lost in the loopholes created by 
confidence intervals and safe harbor.  Districts are able to make AYP by either meeting 
the state benchmark for proficiency or by reducing their number of non-proficient 
students by ten percent, safe harbor.  Mathematically a district could make AYP every 
year through safe harbor and never reach full proficiency.  In addition, states modify the 
pool of students it uses to calculate proficiency (Haney, Madaus, and Wheelock, 2003) 
and allow schools to triage students into special education services to boost proficiency 
levels (Booher-Jennings, 2005).  States ceremonially adopt these practices to maintain 
their legitimacy and appear compliant to the federal mandates.  States avoid the risk of 
failing by making the test easy enough so that most students can pass them, and inflate 
the progress of their schools to ensure a higher rate of success that is actually occurring 
(Haney, Madaus, and Wheelock, 2003).  The combination of risk evasion and the 
ceremonial adoption of policies and practices have led to an increase in cheating in 
schools.   
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 In DiMaggio & Powell (1983) the authors discuss how institutions become more 
isomorphic through three processes; coercive, mimetic, and normative.  Schools and 
districts will coerce change from within by using formal and informal directives, they 
will mimic other districts in hopes of achieving the same results, and they will use 
professional norms to ensure compliance to an industry acceptable standard of 
performance.  Schools have done this with testing practices and interventions to meet the 
demands of NCLB.  Once a testing practice became the preferred professional practice 
within a school, any school that was not doing it was exposed to one or all of the three 
conversion methods that DiMaggio & Powell discuss.  It became a directive from the 
central office or building administration (coercive), it was sold on the benefits it provided 
to the schools it was really working at (mimetic), and you could be considered 
“unprofessional” if you did not think they were a good idea (normative).  States have 
followed a similar model.  States were directed by the federal government to comply or 
lose title funds (coercive), it was packaged as the solution to closing the achievement gap 
(mimetic), and the use a foundational education principal that all students can learn 
implied in the name No Child Left Behind provides ammunition to proponents when the 
policy is questioned (normative).  States quickly institutionalized.   
 In Tolbert & Zucker (1983) the authors discuss how institutions will adopt 
policies or programs to the extent they become institutionalized.  The adoption curve of 
includes early adopters and pioneers accepting every new idea and as each practice  
becomes institutionalized the rate of adoption speeds up until there are only a few left 
who have not adopted the latest innovation.  This was certainly true with increased focus 
on reading and math that has manifested itself in the narrowing of curriculum to eliminate 
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opportunities for students in the arts and science (Harris, 2012).  When early adopters 
began to eliminate time for science and art in elementary schools in favor or additional 
time for reading and math it was initially frowned upon by neighboring schools.  
However, when the school was able to produce increased rates of proficiency, the 
practice became accepted, and later institutionalized.  As this practice became more 
institutionalized, schools districts become more isomorphic, ensuring all would adopt.  At 
the state level, the rate of adoption was motivated by funding, which leads to the second 
organizational theory in play, resource dependency.   
 According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) the purpose of an organization is to 
achieve the same goals shared by its members.  The organization‟s legitimacy is 
determined by the evaluation of society, many of whom have alternating and competing 
criteria.  As a result, the participants who provide the most resources have the most input, 
with the most control over the organization.  The internal demands of the organization 
coupled with the external controls create an obstacle to efficiency and effectiveness.  The 
organization becomes controlled externally based on the actor providing the most 
resources, with all other actors‟ input proportional to the amount of resources provided. 
The dependence on these resources drives the direction of the organization.  The 
dependence of public schools on public funds is evident in the amount of control afforded 
to the state and federal governments at the local level in our schools.  The designation of 
additional funds to meet the higher needs of disadvantaged students, title funds, by the 
federal government provides both a carrot and a stick to local school districts to comply 
with mandates set forth or risk losing the resources needed to achieve their internal 
mission.  These resources drive the policies, procedures, and practices of public school 
17 
 
teachers, administrators, and school boards to comply with external mandates and as a 
result be controlled from the outside.     
 The institutionalism and resource dependency of a state can lead to goal 
displacement.  The ceremonial adoption of policies and procedures, the input afforded to 
external actors based on resource contribution, coupled with the pressure to maintain 
legitimacy inherent in high stakes testing leads states away from their stated mission of 
educating all students to gaming a system to ensure organizational survival.  According to 
Suchman (1995) an organization will conform to gain legitimacy, modify to maintain 
legitimacy, and normalize if it loses legitimacy.  The pressure on states to maintain their 
legitimacy on a yearly basis has led them to be in a constant state of modification.  The 
goal of No Child Left Behind is complete proficiency in reading and math, however the 
high stakes associated with achieving that worthy goal has places schools, districts, and 
states into survival mode, displacing their goal from educating to surviving.      
2.3 - Distortions in Education 
 Since the passage of No Child Left Behind in 2002 there have been multiple 
incidents of schools cheating to improve the scores on state assessment tests used to 
measure their Annual Yearly Progress (AYP).  Between 2009 and 2012 there have been 
documented incidents of schools cheating on standardized tests in Pueblo, Washington 
DC, Houston, Atlanta, Ohio, and Virginia.  School district officials have erased wrong 
answers and substituted the right ones, as they did in Pueblo, Washington DC, Houston, 
and Atlanta (Auge‟ & Simpson, 2012).  Teachers have created study guide questions that 
were identical to the test, as they did in Ohio (Toppo, Amoms, Gillum, & Upton, 2011) 
and they have coached students during the test to help them avoid picking wrong 
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answers, as they did in Houston and Norfolk, Virginia (Gabriel, 2010).  Researchers have 
examined fluctuations and patterns in student test scores to identify teachers suspected of 
cheating (Jacob & Levitt, 2003) all in an effort to maintain the integrity of assessments 
given to students to measure their learning. 
 In blatant cases, such as the ones outlined above, it easy to identify where the 
cheating has occurred.  Other schools have been able to meet the high demands set forth 
by NCLB by making more subtle adjustments in their organization to improve test scores.  
Schools have narrowed their curriculum, fine-tuned their testing practices, and modified 
their testing pools to give their school the best advantage possible to meet the 
benchmarks set by the state to make AYP.  While the gaming of state assessments is not 
technically cheating, the practices employed by schools and districts to make AYP have 
been widely criticized.  These adjustments and modifications have caused schools to 
deviate from their stated educational objectives to focus on proficiency levels in reading 
and math.   
 States have begun to make corrective measures to make it more difficult for 
schools and districts to cheat.  Some states have abandoned the paper and pencil option, 
others require multiple proctors be present when students are testing, and most require 
training take place prior to administering the state assessments.  However, the reported 
cases of schools and districts cheating between 2002 and 2012 have drawn negative 
attention to education at the district and school level.   
 Schools and districts are not the only ones cheating.  States cheat too.  As a part of 
the local control in No Child Left Behind the states are given the authority to determine 
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their own state standards, write and administer their own assessment, determine the cut 
scores for proficiency, and set the benchmarks schools need to hit starting in 2006 to 
prepare all students to be proficient by 2014.  On other measures used to calculate Annual 
Yearly Progress (AYP), such as graduation rate, states have had similar flexibility to 
determine what constituted acceptable progress.  According to Carey (2006), for every 
measure, a significant number of states inflated their progress to appear as though they 
were advancing.  Two examples are graduation rates and proficiency levels on state 
assessments.   
 In Hall (2005) the researcher examines how states report their graduation rates.  
Some states follow a cohort model, tracking students from the day they walk into high 
school, while others simply look at how many students start their senior year and how 
many finish.  The variation in how graduation rate is calculated make it difficult to 
compare states, and some states have changed how they calculate graduation rate from 
year to year, making it difficult to even compare the state against itself.  In addition to the 
calculation of graduation rate, states also have the flexibility to determine what 
acceptable progress is each year in order for a school to make AYP.  The study reports 
thirty-one states accept any progress at all for a school to make AYP while four different 
states require at least .1% increase to make AYP, and two more states just require a 
school to report it to make AYP, not requiring progress.  The way a state calculates 
graduation rates, and the progress needed to make AYP, are both determined at the state 
level and subject to inflation and the distortion of progress. 
 In Haney, Madaus, and Wheelock (2003) the researchers discuss how the 
Department of Education in Massachusetts inflated the proficiency levels it reported.  
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The state calculated its proficiency rates in reading and math by taking the number of 
students that passed the test and divided it by the number of students that graduated.  This 
calculation would have some value if the goal was to determine the proficiency level of 
graduates, but when reporting the proficiency levels for No Child Left Behind, the 
researchers felt it was not an accurate picture of the proficiency level of all students in 
Massachusetts.  In addition to creative proficiency calculations, states also have the 
latitude to set the cut scores necessary to be considered proficient.  In Kansas the cut 
score for reading is 68% and for math it is 50%. In science, although not a component of 
AYP it is still assessed and assigned performance categories, the cut score is 40% to be 
considered proficient.  The arbitrary assignment of cut scores, even within the same state, 
create opportunities for the state to inflate the number of students it determines is 
proficient by setting the score needed to be considered proficient so low that a higher 
percentage of students pass the test.  In addition, the lack of consistency within the same 
state damages the credibility of the measure and calls into question why some tests would 
require a lower score in order to classified as proficient.   
 In this dissertation I will examine if states distort their progress in a high stakes 
testing culture.  Distortion, for the purposes of this dissertation, will be defined as the 
magnitude of the discrepancy between the reported levels of growth the state reports on 
its own high stakes state assessment, compared to the rate of growth on a low stakes 
assessment, the NAEP.  Schools and districts are not the only entity under pressure as a 
result of the NCLB legislation.  State departments of education are also held accountable 
for the performance of the schools in their state.  The state writes the assessments, sets 
the cut scores necessary to be proficient in reading and math, and must report the level of 
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growth to the federal government in order to receive the title funds.  As a result, some 
states have demonstrated remarkable growth on their state assessment rates of 
proficiency, but little or no growth on their NAEP assessment.  Based on the definition of 
distortion provided above, those states have distorted their educational progress, and I 
will suggest some factors to help understand why this occurred.     
 Distortion is an emotional word.  It is tied to a lack of character or integrity, and 
viewed as a negative personality flaw.  However, distortion as defined above, is a rational 
response in a high stakes culture.  States distort their results because of the over-emphasis 
on the results tied to testing.  Donald Campbell, in 1975 developed Campbell‟s Law 
stating, “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision making, the 
more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and 
corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor” (Nichols & Berliner, 2007).  
When resources and legitimacy became tied to state assessment scores it became more 
likely participants in the system would distort their results.  When states were assigned 
the task of ensuring that all students would pass a reading and math test, or risk being 
publicly scolded and have to forfeit part of their funding, it is a rational response that 
states would game the system, lower the bar, and triage the groups to maintain their 
funding and legitimacy.   
  Prior to 2002 most states had a proficiency test in reading and math that was 
given at the elementary level, middle school level, and in high school.  Since 1969 
schools have administered the National Assessment of Education Progress, NAEP, and 
the Iowa Test of Basic Skills, (ITBS) with few reported cases of cheating.  Schools and 
districts wanted to do well on these tests, and the data was examined, but no resources 
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were connected to the results so schools cheated less.  When resources became tied to 
results, the amount of distortion increased.   The distortion that goes on in schools, 
districts, and states can be explained within two theories of organizational sociology, 
institutionalism and resource dependency.         
2.4 - What Makes High Stakes Testing High Stakes 
 Testing became high stakes when resources became tied to results.  Prior to 
NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, ESEA, provided addition funds to 
schools with higher percentages of students it determined were at-risk of failing in 
school.  This legislation was initiated in 1965 as part of President Lyndon Johnson‟s 
“War on Poverty.”  These funds, referred to as title funds, provided money to schools for 
instructional supplies, professional development, resources to support educational 
programs, and to promote parental involvement.  This legislation must be renewed every 
five years and was the first to establish federal funding available to all schools.   
 In 1983, in the landmark report, “A Nation at Risk” reported that “average 
achievement of most high school students on most standardized tests is now lower than 
26 years ago” (Dolezalek, 2009).  This report led to a 1989 governor‟s conference at the 
urging of President George HW Bush to establish higher standards for schools resulting 
in “America 2000” that called for “standards for what children should know and be able 
to do in five core subjects: English, mathematics, science, history, and geography” 
(Dolezalek, 2009).  In addition, it called for testing in grades four, eight, and twelve with 
a recommendation for a voucher system to allow students additional school choice by 
allowing them to be used to attend private schools. 
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 In 1994 congress renewed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 
and encouraged states to meet high standards by establishing Goals 2000.  Included in the 
eight goals of Goals 2000 is goal number three, “grades 4, 8, 12 competency tests in 
English, math, science, history, and geography.”  In 2002, President George W. Bush 
signs the reauthorization of ESEA with overwhelming bipartisan support, establishing the 
framework of No Child Left Behind calling for reading and math proficiency testing in 
grades three, four, five, six, seven, eight, and once in high school by the 2005-06 school 
year.  In addition, it requires teachers to be “highly qualified” requiring a teaching license 
from the state they teach in and a bachelor‟s degree.   
 The defining characteristic of NCLB is the concept of Adequate Yearly Progress, 
AYP.  This established benchmarks for proficiency set by the state to meet in reading and 
math.  In addition, it required schools to test 95% of their students, placing a 1% cap on 
alternative assessments, and a 2% cap on modified assessments.  Schools not making 
AYP two years in a row were classified as “failing” and are required to offering tutoring 
or other supplemental services.  For schools that continue to not make AYP, they risk 
losing their title funds, thereby tying resources to results, establishing the high stakes era. 
 Campbell‟s Law states, “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for 
social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor” 
(Nichols & Berliner, 2007).  In President Johnson‟s “War on Poverty” the social decision 
was made to provide funding for students that need additional resources, coupled with the 
No Child Left Behind policy of assigning the quantitative measure of test scores to 
remain eligible for those funds, has led to resource dependency, institutionalism, and a 
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high stakes culture.  School districts are resource dependent and controlled externally, 
making the ceremonial adoption of policies and procedures necessary to maintain their 
legitimacy and funding.  Deviations from this new norm threaten their existence and 
further raise the importance of the state assessments perpetuating a high stakes culture 
that links resources to results by any means necessary, which has manifested itself in the 
need for some schools, districts, and states to distort their progress.   
2.5 - Low Stakes Testing – NAEP  
 In 1969, with the first reauthorization of Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act (ESEA), the federal government wanted to measure the impact of the title funds it 
had begun distributed in 1965.  As a result, the Department of Education developed the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress, NAEP.  The goal of the NAEP assessment 
was to provide a big picture of the educational progress of the country, the “Nation‟s 
Report Card.”  Originally it reported on regions of the country to provide policymakers a 
big picture of state of education and evaluate the needs of American education on a 
macro-level.  It was not until 1990 that NAEP started to provide state level data, and did 
so in order to compare state educational programs.  On a national level the NAEP 
provides national trend data in grades four, eighth, and twelve and provides state trend 
data in grades four and eight.  As part of the original “War on Poverty” the states that 
receive title funds are required to participate in the NAEP assessment when it is given 
every other year, however no minimum proficiency score is required to ensure continual 
eligibility for funding.   
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 The NAEP assessment is unique because it uses a survey design.  It relies on a 
stratified, random, multi-stage sample to report data on group characteristics.  Originally 
designed as the “Nations Report Card” it does not provide school or student level data.  
For example, the pool of reading questions consists of 100-170 items.  Each student that 
takes the test will answer 20-25 questions, with every test item exposed to approximately 
a quarter of the sample.  This requires a large sample of students to ensure that all 
questions are asked to all the groups of students.  The scale scores are then reported by 
demographic group and grade level for each geographic region of the county and state to 
determine progress.    
 Campbell‟s Law states, “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for 
social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more 
apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor” 
(Nichols & Berliner, 2007).  States are required to give the NAEP to receive title funds, 
as it was initially developed to determine if those funds had any impact.  However, the 
structure of the test, and the sampling needed to represent groups of students, make the 
unit of analysis at the region or state level.  In addition, the performance on the NAEP is 
not reported at the student or school level, therefore no resources are tied to results of the 
test, making the NAEP low stakes.  The absence of dependence on resources has also 
minimized the need to ceremonially adopt any preparation, modification, or structural 
practices at the school level to try to obtain the best score possible.  The NAEP has 
become a thermometer that measures the temperature of the room, with no incentive by 
educators to move a candle closer to provide the illusion of warmth.  As a result, the 
NAEP becomes an appropriate measure to determine if students are learning more as a 
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result of the policies implemented by the  No Child Left Behind reauthorization of ESEA, 
or if states have cheated in their ceremonial compliance with the mandates set for by the 
federal government in order to maintain their funding and legitimacy.          
2.6 - Other Research Comparing State Assessments and the NAEP 
 In this dissertation I will compare student performance at the state level on the 
state assessments and the NAEP to measure the growth of each over a multiple year 
period.  The discrepancy in growth rates on the two assessments will determine a 
distortion index at the state level that will be explained using census data from Integrated 
Public Use Micro-data Series, IPUMS.  My goal is to explain why states cheat.   
 Other research has been conducted using the student scores at the state level on 
state assessments and the NAEP assessment.  This research method, using state 
assessment scores and the NAEP, generally falls into two categories; to determine the 
rigor of state standards based on comparing student performance on state assessment 
versus the NAEP, and to compare levels of proficiency on each test for subgroups to 
examine the achievement gap that exists within most school districts.   
 The first category, using the amount of students proficient or higher on state 
assessments aims to measure the rigor present in the current state standards.  In 
McLaughlin, Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, Chaney, Esra, Hikawa, Rojas, William, 
and Wolman (2008) the research team from the National Center for Educational Statistics 
compared the NAEP and state assessments from the 2002-2003 school year to examine 
levels of proficiency on each test to determine if those results were correlated across 
schools, and if the discrepancies in scores were consistent between subgroups of students.  
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This single year study focused on using the NAEP as the standard and evaluating each 
state, all of whom have different assessments, against one constant to determine the 
quality of each state assessment as well as demonstrate the range that existed within the 
country.   
 In Bandeira de Mello (2011) the researcher determined a NAEP scale equivalent 
score that compares the percentage of who scored proficient or higher on the NAEP 
assessment with the percentage of students that scored proficient or higher on their 
individual state assessment.  A higher NAEP scale equivalent score indicates a better 
match between the two tests, and in the researcher‟s opinion an indication of more 
rigorous standards.  This study, published by NAEP, supports the concept the NAEP is a 
more rigorous assessment because students do not do as well on the test.   
 In Linn, Graue, and Sanders (1990) the researchers compare the number of 
students proficient in each state on their state assessment with the number of students 
proficient on the NAEP assessment.  The goal of this research is to determine how 
“demanding” each state‟s standards are for students.  This article was published twelve 
years prior to NCLB and the authors are only able to obtain data from forty states, 
illustrating a strength of NCLB that requires states to publish their data.  Similar types of 
studies were done with Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, McLaughlin (2009), Schneider 
(2009), and Stoneberg (2007) to determine the rigor of state standards and has been used 
by Dr. Willard Daggett and others a rationale for the need to move to a Common Core 
Curriculum to ensure the same measure of rigor for all states, districts, and schools.   
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 The second type of research in the literature with state assessment scores and 
NAEP scores involve the examination of the achievement gap between subgroups of 
students based on either their race or gender.  In Lee and Reeves (2012) the researchers 
compare NAEP trend data from 1990 to 2009 to determine the impact of NCLB of the 
achievement gap.  Using data prior to NCLB as a baseline the researchers tried to 
determine the growth of various subgroups, along with the gaps that existed between 
them based on each state‟s instructional capacity, ability to track data, fidelity of 
implementation, and rigor of their standards.  The researchers examined number of 
students reported proficient by their racial identity on the state assessment and tried to 
compare those numbers to the number of students proficient on the NAEP assessment.  
They reported the same magnitude of discrepancy present on each test to illustrate which 
measure was more effective to identify the differences between groups.   
 In Ho and Reardon (2011) the researchers examine the achievement gap by 
designing a V statistic to better explain the differences in performance categories by 
students of different races on state assessments, Advanced Placement tests, and English 
proficiency tests when compared to the NAEP.  The goal is similar to the Lee and Reeves 
(2012) study to determine how each assessment identifies differences in achievement by 
different students.  Ho and Reardon incorporate the use of the V statistic to allow them to 
drill down and better identify the differences between groups of students.   
 Similar types of studies were done with Reardon, Greenberg, Kalogrides, Shores, 
Valentino, (2012) and Condon, Greenberg, Stephan, Williams, Gerdeman, van der Ploeg 
(2012) to determine the impact of NCLB on the achievement gap that exists within 
29 
 
school districts by looking at how students of different races perform on their local state 
assessment versus how they perform on the NAEP. 
 This dissertation will add to the research in that it will develop a cheating index to 
quantify the discrepancy between the high stakes state assessment and the low stakes 
NAEP assessment.  That cheating index will quantify the discrepancy in the rates of 
growth between the two assessments.  Furthermore it will seek to explain why cheating 
occurs using census data to more fully explain the external factors associated with higher 
rates of cheating. 
2.7 - Conclusion 
 Cheating occurs in education.  The cheating that has occurred at the state level, as 
a result of the No Child Left Behind legislation, is a rational response in a high stakes 
culture.  Under the pressure to produce results, in this case proficient students, states have 
followed Campbell‟s law which says, “the more any quantitative social indicator is used 
for social decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the 
more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor” 
(Nichols & Berliner, 2007).  The corruption within the state is supported by two theories 
in organizational sociology, institutionalism and resource dependency, that has resulted in 
goal displacement by the states.  The history of No Child Left Behind, traced back to 
Lyndon Johnson‟s War on Poverty, illustrates how a policy born out of good intentions 
can be corrupted under the pressure to produce results.   
 The baseline assessment for student achievement in this country is the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress, NAEP, because of its stratified, random sample and 
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strategy for questioning students.  The sampling and questioning techniques enable 
schools and students to be measured, free of the fear of retribution or loss of resources.   
Initially developed in 1969 to provide regional data, and revised in 1990 to provide state 
level data for fourth and eighth grade reading and math scores, the NAEP is a low stakes 
measure that allows policymakers to determine the progress of their state in a way that is 
less threatening to each states resources and legitimacy.  States that receive title funds are 
required to administer the NAEP, but the test‟s structure and format do not allow the 
results to be traced back to an individual school or student making it low stakes at the 
local level. 
 Some states have been able to show remarkable progress on the rates of 
proficiency of their own state assessment, but very little or no progress on their NAEP 
assessment, those states have distorted their progress.  Distortion, as defined in this 
dissertation, is the discrepancy over time of a state‟s performance on the state assessment 
versus the NAEP.  States that show big gains on their state assessment, but little or no 
gain of their NAEP assessment have probably aligned their curriculum, manipulated their 
testing practices, and set the cut scores low enough that most students could attain 
proficiency.  These responses to the pressure to maintain legitimacy are rational and 
explained by Campbell‟s law as well as organizational theory on resource dependency 
and institutionalism.  In this dissertation, a distortion index will be created to measure the 
discrepancy over time between each states reported proficiency on the state assessment 
and their NAEP score.   
 The distortion index will allow me to quantify the level of distortion that has 
occurred at the state level.  Once quantified, I will access census data using the Integrated 
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Public Use Micro-data Series, IPUMS, in an effort to suggest possible predictors to better 
understand why this distortion has occurred.  This dissertation will provide a twist to 
most of the current research that has focus on comparing the two assessments to evaluate 
the rigor of individual state‟s standards or the achievement gap between groups of 
students.  This dissertation will attempt to suggest predictors to the distortion that occurs 
and could potentially add to the discussion on the role of assessments in our schools what 
other factors influence the results we measure from our students.      
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Chapter 3  
Methods 
3.1 - Goals of this Dissertation  
 The goal of this dissertation is to examine the extent to which states distort their 
progress and suggest possible predictors to help explain why these distortions occur.  To 
do this, I will evaluate the change of each state‟s reported growth on their own state 
assessment to measure levels of proficiency in reading and math when compared to the 
their growth on the NAEP assessment over the same period of time.  States that reported 
similar levels of growth disparity from the NAEP assessment will then be grouped 
together and examined using Integrated Public Use Micro-data Series, IPUMS, to 
determine what demographic characteristics correlate with the different levels of disparity 
between the high stakes state assessment and the low stakes NAEP assessments. 
 The levels of distortion will be determined by the disparity between the reported 
progress on state assessments and reported progress on the NAEP assessment.  States that 
show high levels of growth on their own state assessment, but very little or no growth on 
the NAEP, will be classified as the states that distort the most.  The states that show a 
similar growth pattern on their state assessment as they do on the NAEP will be classified 
as distorting less. 
 The NAEP assessment provides state level data for analysis in fourth and eighth 
grades, as a result those grades will also be the primary focus on the state assessments 
when the comparison is completed.   
3.2 - Data Sources 
33 
 
 For this dissertation there will be three primary sources of data, the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) data explorer, state department of education 
websites, and census data.   
 The NAEP data explorer allows the researcher to customize the test data they 
intend to use.  For my study I will look at reading test scores for fourth grade.  The NAEP 
offers data for twelfth grade, but it is only national trend data and in this study I will 
compare states, which is not available for twelfth grade.  The variable and description is 
listed in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1   
Source Code Description 
NAEP er_n  State‟s Average Score on the Elementary Reading Test 
   
 
 The second source of data is the State Department of Education for each state in 
the study.  This data source will be used to obtain the percentage of students the state has 
reported as proficient in reading in an elementary grade, usually third or fourth grade.  
Each state‟s website is different and some have a data explorer similar to the NAEP, but 
most do not.  Most of this data was obtained by looking at the State Report Card for each 
year.  On the State Report Card it typically reports the number of students proficient in 
reading and math by grade level.  If the website did not have a data explored, or publish a 
state report card, then I contacted the state directly by email and asked for the scores.  All 
the reported levels of proficiency in reading on the state assessment came from their 
individual state department of education and are reported as proficient or higher scores.  
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Most states did not offer this data disaggregated by subgroup so the numbers reported are 
for all students.  
Table 3.2 
Source Code Description 
State Test er_s Elementary Students Proficient on the State Reading Assessment 
   
 
 The final source of data for this study is the United States Census.  For individual 
and household level variable I was able to use the Integrated Public Use Micro-data 
Series, IPUMS, as a data explorer to identify variables and pull proxies for social, 
economic, and family characteristics tied to success in school.  To aggregate this to the 
state level, the data was pulled by state code and the mean collapsed for each state to 
obtain a state level average for each variable listed below.  
Parent‟s Level of Education 
In IPUMS the variable has eleven different codes, as listed below:  
00 – No schooling 
01 – Nursery school to grade 4 
02 – Grade 5, 6, 7, or 8 
03 – Grade 9 
04 – Grade 10 
05 – Grade 11 
06 – Grade 12 
07 – 1 year of college 
08 – 2 years of college 
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09 – 3 years of college 
10 – 4 years of college 
11 – 5+ years of college 
To simplify this variable I used STATA to combine some of the categories and collapse 
the mean by the state.  To recode and include everyone in the dataset I made the 
following changes.  
 IPUMS (00) became (01) – to represent those people with no schooling  
IPUMS (01) became (02) – to represent those people with only elementary school  
IPUMS (02) became (03) – to represent those people with only middle school 
IPUMS (03, 04, 05, 06) became (04) to represent those people with high school 
IPUMS (07, 08, 09, 10) became (05) to represent those people with college 
IPUMS (11) became (06) to represent those people with graduate school 
Once recoded I collapsed the mean by state for each of the years collected; 2003, 2005, 
2007, and 2009.  The STATA code is noted below. 
gen school=1 
replace school=2 if (educ==1) 
replace school=3 if (educ==2) 
replace school=4 if (educ==3 | educ==4| educ==5 |educ==6) 
replace school=5 if (educ==7 | educ==8 | educ==9 |educ==10) 
replace school=6 if (educ==11) 
collapse (mean) school, by (statefip) 
Father‟s Location in the Home 
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In IPUMS the variable is called “poploc” to indicate the father‟s location within the 
home.  To interpret this data the researcher needs to know that any number greater than 
(00) indicates a father lives in the household.  The number assigned by the census for this 
variable is person number listed on the census form that is returned.  If the father happens 
to be listed first, he is number one, if he is listed second; he is number two, and so on.  In 
my data the range of data went from one to fifteen.  As a result, I recoded all numbers to 
be (01) if the father was present and (00 if he was not present.  I then collapsed the mean 
by the state id number by the four years of data I collected; 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009.  
The STATA code I used is listed below.      
gen dad=0 
replace dad =1 if (poploc==1 | poploc ==2 | poploc==3 | poploc ==4 | poploc==5 | poploc 
==6 | poploc==7 | poploc ==8 | poploc==9 | poploc ==10 | poploc==11 | poploc ==12 | 
poploc==13 | poploc ==14 |poploc==15) 
collapse (mean) dad, by (statefip) 
Poverty 
In IPUMS the three digit poverty variable expresses the percentage of the poverty 
threshold the family meets based on the previous year‟s income when compared to the 
poverty income determined by the Social Security Administration.  For example, (050) 
would indicate the respondent has reported and income that is 50% of the poverty 
threshold income, while someone that reported (200) would be living at 200% of the 
income representing poverty.  The higher the number indicates less poverty.  In addition, 
this is a household variable so each member of the reporting family has the same number.  
To aggregate this to state level I simply collapsed the mean of each respondent to the 
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state code for each of the years represented; 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009.  The STATA 
code is represented below. 
collapse (mean) poverty , by (statefip) 
Race – Black  
In IPUMS the RACBLK variable allows the respondent to indicate if they identify 
themselves as black.  The respondent can mark as many races as they wish to identify 
themselves as for the census report.  The census codes the responses as (01) for no, and 
(02) for yes.  For this variable I collapsed the mean by state code for each of the years 
represented; 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009.  The STATA code is represented below. 
collapse (mean) racblk , by (statefip) 
Birthplace 
In IPUMS the (BPL) Birthplace variable allows the respondent to indicate the state or 
country in which they were born.  The state codes are the same as the state census codes 
from 1-99.  All numbers above 100 represent another country outside the United States.  
For this variable I recoded all the respondents as (1) if they had a birthplace code of less 
than 100, to indicate they were born in the USA, and (0) if they had a birthplace code of 
greater than 100.  For this variable I collapsed the mean by state code for each of the 
years represented; 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009.  The STATA code is represented below. 
gen bp=1 
replace bp=0 if (bpl<100) 
collapse (mean) bpl, by (statefip) 
Manufacturing 
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In IPUMS the (IND) Industry Code assigns a four-digit number based on the reported 
occupation of the responder.  The codes are then categorized into the seventeen 
categories listed below: 
1. Not Applicable (0000) 
2. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting (0170 – 0290) 
3. Mining (0370 – 0490) 
4. Construction (0770) 
5. Manufacturing (1070 – 3990) 
6. Retail Trade (4070 – 5790) 
7. Transportation and Warehousing (6070 – 6390) 
8. Utilities (0570 – 0690) 
9. Information and Communications (6470 – 6780) 
10. Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Rental and Leasing (6870 – 7190) 
11. Professional, Scientific, Management, Administrative, and Waste Management 
Services (7270 – 7790) 
12. Education, Health, and Social Services (7860 – 8470) 
13. Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommodations, and Food Services (8560 – 
8690) 
14. Other Services (Except Public Administration) (8770 – 9290) 
15. Public Administration (9370 – 9590) 
16. Armed Forces (9670 – 9870) 
17. Unemployed (9920) 
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To combine categories in order to classify each occupation as either “manufacturing” or 
“not manufacturing” I recoded all the job codes as (1) and then changed every code less 
than 999 or greater than 4000 to (0).  This created two classifications, manufacturing (1) 
and not manufacturing (0).  I then collapsed the mean by state code for the years 2003, 
2005, 2007, and 2009.  The STATA code is represented below. 
gen manuf=1 
replace manuf=0 if (ind<999 | ind>4000) 
collapse (mean) manuf, by (statefip) 
Population 
To obtain state level variable, population, I utilized the data explorer on the census.gov 
website.  I obtained the population for each year in the study; 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2009.  
Per Pupil Expenditure 
To find the (PPE) Per Pupil Expenditure I researched the website 
http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/Rankings.aspx?ind=5199 to obtain the 
data for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009.  The Kids Count website uses census data 
in a search engine to allow access to state level data.   
Listed in table 3.3 is a summary of the IPUMS and Census variables collected and used 
in this study, as well as the code I used in STATA. 
Table 3.3  
Source STATA Code Description 
IPUM dad State‟s Level of Fathers Residing in the Home 
IPUM school State‟s Level of Parental Educational Attainment 
IPUM poverty State‟s Level of Citizens in Poverty 
IPUM manuf State‟s Level of Manufacturing 
IPUM black State‟s Level of African-Americans 
IPUM bp Birth place 
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Census st_pop Population of the State 
Census ppe Per Pupil Expenditure for Education 
 
3.3 - Data Collection 
For this dissertation there will be three primary sources of data, the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress (NAEP) data explorer, state department of education websites, 
and census data.  To collect this data it involved using the resources available for each 
entity.  
 To obtain the NAEP data I used the NAEP data explorer.  In August of 2011 I 
was fortunate enough to attend a seminar in Washington DC, sponsored by the National 
Center for Educational Statistics (NCES), over how to use the NAEP databases.  The 
training included a history of the NAEP assessment as well as the potential and 
limitations of how the data could be used.  At this training, I learned the NAEP data 
explorer would be the best resource to obtain state level measures on the NAEP 
assessment.  The NAEP is a unique measure because of its stratified, random sampling 
technique that does not provide student or school level data.  The smallest reliable 
measure is at the state level, so it quickly became ideal for this study.   
 The goal of this study is to compare NAEP data with state assessment levels of 
proficiency.  However, the NAEP scores are not reported in categories relative to 
proficiency, it is only reported by the average score in each subgroup.  This will allow a 
reliable and consistent measure in which to compare state‟s levels of performance.   
 To obtain the each state‟s levels or reported proficiency on state reading and math 
assessments required the most work.  In the absence of a state assessment data explorer, 
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with each state using their own individual assessment, it required a seminar on each 
state‟s testing plan to identify the test they used and how they reported their results.  To 
try to obtain consistent data I tried to obtain fourth and eighth grade levels of proficiency 
in reading for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009.  However, this was not always 
possible.  Some states did not test those grades prior to 2006, the year they were required 
to do so as part of NCLB.  If they were testing grades three or seven I continued that 
trend until 2009.   
 Some states were missing state assessment data.  Minnesota and New Hampshire 
did not have elementary or middle school reading levels for 2003 or 2005.  New Mexico 
and Ohio did not have middle school reading data for 2003.   Rhode Island did not have 
elementary or middle school reading data for 2005.  Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia 
did not have elementary or middle school reading data for 2003.  To account for the 
missing data I matched it to the closest reported year the state did have data so that it 
reflected no progress.  The purpose of this study is to show the misrepresentation of 
progress at the state level, and filling in the missing data with the next data point 
established no gain.  See Appendix 1. 
 Each state publishes some version of a State Report Card.  On the Report Card 
they will report the proficiency level in reading and math for selected grades.  Finding 
these report cards for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009 was the method I used to 
obtain this data.  Some report cards reported multiple years of scores, but most states did 
not.  To obtain the data for all 50 states, with four years of data, required locating 
approximately 200 state report cards.   
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 To obtain the census level data I used two sources, the Integrated Public Use 
Micro-data Series, IPUMS, data explorer and the census website.  The individual and 
household level variables are accessible through the IPUMS data explorer.  Using that 
tool I was able to obtain the six variables outlined above for the years; 2003, 2005, 2007, 
and 2009. 
 To obtain the state level variables for the population and financial information I 
used the census.gov data explorer.  Similar to IPUMS it allowed the researcher to build 
reports and charts customized to your study.  I chose the population data and the financial 
information because I am interested in looking at not only the expenditures per pupil but 
also the expenditures per citizen in states that are identified as cheating the most. 
 
3.4 - Analysis Strategy 
Standardization of Data  
 The goal of this study is to suggest predictors to why states distort their 
educational progress.  To do this requires the standardization of variables to allow for 
comparison.  The data measuring the state‟s reported proficiency level on their measure 
used for No Child Left Behind, their state assessment score in reading for elementary and 
middle school, is measured in percentage of the testing sample scoring proficient or 
higher.  The low-stakes NAEP score for the corresponding grade level and year is 
measured in raw score out of a possible 500 points.  The state population is measure in 
the number of registered citizens.  The per-pupil expenditure is measured in dollars spent 
per pupil on education.  The manufacturing level of each state was calculated based on 
43 
 
the number census respondents reporting a manufacturing occupation.  The poverty 
variable is a combination of all the respondents‟ relationship to the poverty level 
established by the Social Security Administration.  The educational attainment of the 
parents is the combination of a six-level matrix developed to simplify an eleven-level 
matric and aggregated to the state level.  The race variable, father‟s location, and 
birthplace are bivariate variables aggregated to the state level for four different years.  
The number of different variables and measures required each to be standardized in order 
to compare and interpret the data. 
 To standardize the data the first task was to determine the data set.  For this study, 
three different ways to standardize the data were discussed.  The first was a vertical 
standardization by year.  Each variable would be nested within the year across all states, 
and the standard error would be accounted for within the year.  The second was a grand 
standardization by comparing each data point against the entire dataset for all states in all 
years, thereby losing any of the benefits of a panel dataset.  The third way, which was the 
final one used in the analysis, was a horizontal standardization, thereby containing the 
standard error within the state by using each state‟s data for all four years to create a Z-
score by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the four data points (2003, 2005, 
2007, and 2009) to standardize each data point used in the study.  For example: 
State 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Alabama – Raw Score 51 68 71 75 
Alabama – Z Score -1.44 .165 .449 .828 
 
Mean of the Alabama raw scores is: 66.25 
Standard Deviation of the Alabama raw scores is: 10.56 
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Z Score = (Raw Score – Mean)/Standard Deviation 
The reason this standardization method was selected was to ensure that each state 
contained its own standard error, and it allowed for the benefits of a panel dataset, 
allowing each state to nest within itself, and the z-transformation approach is based on 
procedures outlined by Koretz (2008).  Each variable in this study; state assessment 
proficiency levels, NAEP scores, per citizen expenditures on education, state population, 
parents level of education, poverty status, father‟s location in the home, African-
American status, and white status were all standardized in this way to allow for 
comparison and interpretation.   
Growth Models 
 The basis of this study is comparing the growth on the state assessment versus the 
growth on the NAEP assessment.  To determine the growth I looked at the change in 
scores from 2003 to 2005, from 2005 to 2007, and from 2007 to 2009 to give each state 
three measures of growth over the seven years of the study.  To calculate the growth I 
used the following equation: 
    Growth  
      
       
  
However, two significant adjustments had to be made in order for the model to accurately 
reflect the growth on the state assessment and NAEP scores.  First, the number used for 
the max.  On the state assessment the theoretical maximum possible for each state to 
achieve in any given year was 100%, and some states approached this number.  The 
theoretical maximum score possible on the NAEP assessment is a score of 500, and no 
state scored above 250.  As a result it was determined to develop a growth measure based 
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on the practical growth within a year based on the maximum score on each assessment 
within a given year.  This modifies the above equation in the following way:  
    Growth  
      
         
  
The second adjustment occurred by adjusting the “practical max” score to a “standardized 
practical max” score by determining where the practical max existed within the standard 
distribution of a set of scores within a given year.  When combined with the existing data 
points it creates the following Practical Normed Growth equation: 
 Practical Normed Growth (PNG)  
      
         
  
 t2 = time 2   
 t1 = time 1 
 t1Max = Maximum Score within a given year and then standardized based on the 
mean and standard deviation of all the scores across all states within that given year.    
Distortion Index Calculation 
 To calculate the distortion index I subtracted the practical normed growth on the 
NAEP assessment from the practical normed growth on state assessment, represented in 
the equation below.  The purpose of calculating it in this way allows the distortion metric 
to remain positive when distortion has occurred and it is anticipated that most states will 
show less growth on the NAEP than they did their own state assessment.  In addition, this 
method of calculation allows for the distortion to reflect the discrepancy in growth 
measures on the two tests, the foundation of this study.  The equation is represented 
below: 
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    Distortion Index = PNGstate - PNGNAEP 
Fixed Effects Time Variant Panel Regression Model 
To analyze this data, based on how it has been standardized, I will use a panel regression 
model that allows the standard error to be nested within the state, since it is the unit of 
analysis.  In STATA, this approach does the same thing as creating a dummy code to 
calculate the error for each data point, as it mean centers the data.  The commands are 
listed below based on how the variables are identified within the program.   
Elementary Reading Stata Commands 
xi: xtreg ch_png_hz_er per_cit_exp_hz st_pop_hz, i(statenum) fe 
xi: xtreg ch_png_hz_er per_cit_exp_hz st_pop_hz manuf_hz school_hz, i(statenum) fe 
xi: xtreg ch_png_hz_er per_cit_exp_hz st_pop_hz manuf_hz school_hz poverty_hz 
dad_hz black_hz white_hz, i(statenum) fe 
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Chapter 4 
Results of the Research 
In this chapter I will outline the results of the two research questions posed in this 
dissertation.   
1. Do states misrepresent their progress on their own state assessments? 
2.  If states do distort their progress, are their predictors to suggest why this 
distortion occurs? 
4.1 Research Question #1 – Do States Misrepresent their Progress? 
1. Do states misrepresenting their progress on their own state assessments? 
 In order to determine if states have misrepresented their progress I calculated the 
Practical Normed Growth (PNG) for each state‟s individual state assessment and the 
NAEP for three time periods; 2003 to 2005, 2005 to 2007, and 2007 to 2009.  The 
formula is listed below and explained in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
   Practical Normed Growth (PNG)  
      
         
 
 Once the PNG had been calculated for each test within each time period, I then 
calculated a cheating index by subtracting the PNG of the NAEP assessment from the 
PNG of the state assessment.  The formula is listed below and is also explained in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
   Distortion Index = PNGstate - PNGNAEP 
A positive distortion index indicates the state is reporting more growth on their state 
assessment than they achieved on the NAEP assessment.  A negative distortion index 
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indicates the NAEP assessment grew faster than the state assessment and the state 
underrepresented their progress to their constituents.   This process was followed for both 
the elementary reading assessment, which is represented in Table 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. 
Elementary Reading from 2003 – 2005 
 The map above and Table 4.1 provide a summary of the state assessment and 
NAEP Practical Normed Growth (PNG) calculations from 2003 to 2005 on the 
elementary reading assessment.  Thirty-two out of fifty states have a positive distortion 
index, indicating they showed more growth on their own state assessment than they did 
on the NAEP.  The four states with the highest distortion index on these tests, for this 
time period are West Virginia (18.1243), North Carolina (7.6970), Connecticut (1.7369), 
and Iowa (1.6484).  West Virginia reported 81% proficient on their state reading 
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assessment in 2003, and 81% again in 2005.  However, their NAEP score dropped from 
219 to 215.  North Carolina reported a state assessment reading proficiency of 81% in 
2003, and an increase to 82% in 2005, but their NAEP score dropped from 221to 217.  
Connecticut reported 68% proficient or higher on their state reading assessment in both 
2003 and 2005, but their NAEP score dropped from 228 to 226.  Iowa reported 70% of its 
4
th
 graders proficient on the Iowa Test of Educational Development (ITED) in 2003, and 
79% proficient in 2005, but their scores on the NAEP assessment fell from 223 to 221.  
The results of all 50 states, including the 18 states with a negative distortion index are 
listed in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 - Elementary Reading 2003 - 2005 
  State NAEP DI   State NAEP DI 
Alabama 0.6088 0.0512 0.5576 Montana -0.1488 0.4037 -0.5526 
Alaska 0.5995 -0.1559 0.7554 Nebraska 0.3120 0.2617 0.0503 
Arizona 0.4788 -0.8635 1.3423 Nevada -0.0912 0.0400 -0.1312 
Arkansas -0.7788 0.6981 -1.4769 New Hampshire 0.0000 -0.1814 0.1814 
California 0.2960 0.1766 0.1194 New Jersey 0.3442 -0.2333 0.5775 
Colorado -18.6861 -0.0023 -18.6839 New Mexico 0.0000 0.3726 -0.3726 
Connecticut 0.0000 -1.7369 1.7369 New York 0.4147 0.1915 0.2232 
Delaware 0.9002 0.7656 0.1346 North Carolina 0.1049 -7.5921 7.6970 
Florida 0.4010 0.1554 0.2456 North Dakota 0.2522 0.4910 -0.2388 
Georgia 0.3506 0.1242 0.2263 Ohio 0.4671 0.1451 0.3219 
Hawaii 0.3322 0.2278 0.1044 Oklahoma 0.7141 0.0573 0.6569 
Idaho -1.2743 0.5687 -1.8431 Oregon 0.3973 -0.4794 0.8766 
Illinois 0.3420 0.0441 0.2978 Pennsylvania 0.2649 0.4401 -0.1751 
Indiana 0.7182 -0.6730 1.3912 Rhode Island 0.2654 -0.0079 0.2733 
Iowa 0.5761 -1.0722 1.6484 South Carolina 0.4244 -1.0330 1.4574 
Kansas 0.4173 0.0554 0.3619 South Dakota 0.2758 0.1051 0.1707 
Kentucky 0.3875 0.1189 0.2686 Tennessee 0.4331 0.3755 0.0577 
Louisiana -0.4110 0.8210 -1.2320 Texas -0.4060 0.5898 -0.9958 
Maine 0.1425 0.3801 -0.2376 Utah 0.0000 0.7071 -0.7071 
Maryland 0.4067 0.1436 0.2632 Vermont 0.0000 0.2312 -0.2312 
Massachusetts -3.4462 0.3635 -3.8097 Virginia -5.9648 0.4915 -6.4563 
Michigan 0.5932 -0.3582 0.9514 Washington 0.7915 0.6376 0.1539 
Minnesota 0.0000 0.7652 -0.7652 West Virginia 0.0000 -18.1243 18.1243 
Mississippi 0.0000 -0.1808 0.1808 Wisconsin 0.0000 0.1213 -0.1213 
Missouri 0.0567 -0.5602 0.6169 Wyoming 0.0823 0.3406 -0.2583 
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Elementary Reading from 2005 – 2007 
  
 The map above and Table 4.2 provide summary of the state assessment and 
NAEP Practical Normed Growth (PNG) calculations from 2005 to 2007 on the 
elementary reading assessment.  Thirteen out of fifty states have a positive distortion 
index, indicating they showed more growth on their own state assessment than they did 
on the NAEP.  The four states with the highest distortion index on these tests, for this 
time period are; Louisiana (2.1092), Missouri (.6169), South Carolina (.5368), and 
Connecticut (.4651).  Louisiana‟s reading proficiency increased from 52% to 58% on 
their state reading assessment of fourth graders, but their NAEP score dropped from 209 
to 207.  Missouri‟s state assessment scores jumped from 35% to 46%, but their NAEP 
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score was stagnant at 221.  South Carolina increased their reading scores from 79% to 
82%, but the NAEP scores only increased from 213 to 214.  Connecticut increased their 
state assessment scores from 68% to 71%, but their NAEP scores rose at a much slower 
rate increasing from 226 to 227. 
Table 4.2 - Elementary Reading 2005 - 2007 
  State NAEP DI   State NAEP DI 
Alabama 0.0519 0.6981 -0.6462 Montana 0.6478 0.7929 -0.1452 
Alaska 0.2993 0.9484 -0.6491 Nebraska 0.3779 0.7061 -0.3282 
Arizona 0.2756 0.6369 -0.3613 Nevada 0.7524 0.6653 0.0871 
Arkansas 0.3892 -0.0292 0.4184 New Hampshire 0.0000 0.6905 -0.6905 
California 0.2102 0.4901 -0.2799 New Jersey -0.1312 0.7833 -0.9145 
Colorado -0.0527 0.0357 -0.0884 New Mexico 0.9510 0.7970 0.1540 
Connecticut 0.8209 0.3558 0.4651 New York -0.2362 0.4938 -0.7299 
Delaware -5.4093 -1.3132 -4.0961 North Carolina 0.3514 0.1729 0.1785 
Florida 0.3347 0.5162 -0.1815 North Dakota 0.3372 0.4610 -0.1238 
Georgia -1.8893 0.7583 -2.6477 Ohio 0.3506 0.7971 -0.4465 
Hawaii 0.5527 0.8761 -0.3234 Oklahoma -0.0892 0.6664 -0.7556 
Idaho -0.5603 0.5659 -1.1262 Oregon -3.6251 -0.8537 -2.7713 
Illinois 0.6236 0.7216 -0.0980 Pennsylvania 0.5046 0.6910 -0.1864 
Indiana -1.2743 0.6206 -1.8949 Rhode Island 0.0000 0.3379 -0.3379 
Iowa 0.1510 0.8587 -0.7077 South Carolina 0.7373 0.2005 0.5368 
Kansas 0.3581 0.7548 -0.3967 South Dakota 0.1904 0.9353 -0.7448 
Kentucky 0.4218 0.3833 0.0385 Tennessee 0.0000 0.4040 -0.4040 
Louisiana 0.2913 -1.8180 2.1092 Texas 0.7219 0.3188 0.4030 
Maine 0.5818 0.8250 -0.2433 Utah 0.7015 -0.0586 0.7601 
Maryland 0.4571 0.5876 -0.1305 Vermont -1.8133 0.5358 -2.3491 
Massachusetts 0.6459 0.6952 -0.0493 Virginia -0.6117 0.5171 -1.1289 
Michigan 0.1822 0.9273 -0.7451 Washington -0.8759 0.3776 -1.2535 
Minnesota 0.0000 -0.3853 0.3853 West Virginia 0.1907 0.0781 0.1126 
Mississippi 0.2926 0.4884 -0.1958 Wisconsin -2.3503 0.8992 -3.2495 
Missouri 0.0567 -0.5602 0.6169 Wyoming 0.8369 0.8821 -0.0452 
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Elementary Reading from 2007 – 2009 
 The map above and Table 4.3 provide a summary of the state assessment and 
NAEP Practical Normed Growth (PNG) calculations from 2007 to 2009 on the 
elementary reading assessment.  Thirty-one out of fifty states have a positive distortion 
index, indicating they showed more growth on their own state assessment than they did 
on the NAEP.  The four states with the highest distortion index on these tests, for this 
time period are; Alaska (17.6027), Wisconsin (13.1808), Michigan (12.9353), and Maine 
(8.9547).  In Alaska the scores dropped on both the state assessment and the NAEP.  On 
their state reading assessment it fell from 79% to 78%, for a negative PNG of -.4272, but 
the NAEP had a much larger negative PNG of -18.0299 as it‟s scores fell from 214 to 
211.  In Wisconsin the state assessment proficiency levels stayed the same from 2007 to 
2009, holding steady at 81%.  However, the Wisconsin NAEP assessment dropped from 
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223 to 220.  The same thing happened in Michigan with scores of 84% both years on the 
state assessment, but the NAEP score did not drop as much as Wisconsin, only falling 
two points as it dropped from 220 to 218.  Finally, in Maine the state assessment scores 
increased from 67% to 71%, but the NAEP score dropped from 226 to 224.    
 On the elementary reading assessment, over the three growth periods examined, 
32 states had a positive distortion index from 2003 to 2005, 13 states had a positive 
distortion index from 2005 to 2007, and 31 states had a positive distortion index from 
2007 to 2009.  In 150 possible opportunities to cheat, 50 states in three time periods, 
states cheated 76 times, or 51% of the time.   
Table 4.3 - Elementary Reading 2007 - 2009 
  State NAEP Cheating   State NAEP Cheating 
Alabama 0.1641 -0.0309 0.1951 Montana 0.3678 -3.6483 4.0161 
Alaska -0.4272 -18.0299 17.6027 Nebraska 0.6076 -0.5975 1.2051 
Arizona 0.3805 0.3457 0.0348 Nevada -0.3377 0.1760 -0.5137 
Arkansas 0.7964 -0.5697 1.3661 New Hampshire 0.9510 0.1799 0.7711 
California 0.7984 0.5930 0.2055 New Jersey -1.9718 -0.6161 -1.3557 
Colorado 0.0501 0.9504 -0.9003 New Mexico -19.4237 -3.2332 -16.1905 
Connecticut -1.5280 0.6732 -2.2012 New York 0.8597 0.5692 0.2905 
Delaware 0.0000 0.3272 -0.3272 North Carolina -2.8895 0.3561 -3.2456 
Florida 0.5031 0.5607 -0.0575 North Dakota -3.0523 -0.2022 -2.8501 
Georgia 0.7473 -0.7322 1.4796 Ohio 0.2699 -1.4227 1.6926 
Hawaii 0.1235 -5.1970 5.3206 Oklahoma -2.2115 0.1517 -2.3632 
Idaho 0.7182 -2.0096 2.7278 Oregon 0.3563 0.7645 -0.4082 
Illinois -0.2762 -0.1978 -0.0784 Pennsylvania 0.4366 -1.6697 2.1063 
Indiana 0.5603 0.4481 0.1123 Rhode Island 0.9031 0.8668 0.0363 
Iowa 0.1779 -5.1654 5.3433 South Carolina -6.5480 0.8342 -7.3822 
Kansas 0.4185 -0.5395 0.9579 South Dakota -2.5873 -17.8009 15.2136 
Kentucky 0.3648 0.7874 -0.4225 Tennessee 0.7640 0.4386 0.3255 
Louisiana 0.8905 0.0291 0.8614 Texas 0.0000 -0.4012 0.4012 
Maine 0.3974 -8.5573 8.9547 Utah 0.0000 -2.2992 2.2992 
Maryland 0.2105 0.3798 -0.1693 Vermont 0.6445 0.4128 0.2317 
Massachusetts -0.7296 -1.0216 0.2919 Virginia 0.2277 -0.4931 0.7208 
Michigan 0.0000 -12.9353 12.9353 Washington -0.4669 -3.1570 2.6901 
Minnesota 0.9510 -1.4200 2.3710 West Virginia -2.2379 -0.1422 -2.0957 
Mississippi -2.5405 0.7537 -3.2942 Wisconsin 0.0000 -13.1808 13.1808 
Missouri 0.1772 0.8933 -0.7161 Wyoming -2.1994 -9.7308 7.5314 
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Table 4.4 - Number of States with Positive Cheating Index 
  2003-05 2005-07 2007-09 
Elementary Reading 32 13 31 
 
 The first research question of this dissertation was to determine if states distort 
their progress educational progress by misrepresenting their progress on their own state 
assessments?  This research suggests they do cheat more than half of the time.  On the 
elementary reading assessment comparison the states cheated 76 out of 150 times, or 
51%.  These findings lead to the second research question, are there any predictors that 
help to explain why this cheating occurs.   
4.2 Research Question #2 – Do Any Predictors Explain Why States Distort their 
Progress? 
 
Fixed Effects Time Variant Panel Regression Model 
 To analyze this data, based on how it has been standardized, I used a fixed effects 
time variant panel regression model that allows the standard error to be nested within the 
state, since it is the unit of analysis.  In STATA, this approach does the same thing as 
creating a dummy code to calculate the error for each data point, as it mean centers the 
data for each of the eight predictors used in the models.   
 In order to produce a stepwise approach I created three models for each analysis.  
The first model uses predictors contributed by the home, the second model combines the 
home predictors with community predictors, and the third model combines home and 
community predictors with the state level predictors.  In the first model of fixed effects 
time variant regression, the African-American status, father‟s location in the home, 
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parents level of education, and born in the USA were compared to the Practical Normed 
Growth (PNG) Cheating Index created by subtracting the NAEP‟s PNG from the state‟s 
PNG.   
 In the second model the first four predictors, the African-American status, father‟s 
location in the home, parents level of education, and born in the USA remained and the 
state‟s level of manufacturing along with poverty were added.  In the third model, all the 
predictors were included; per pupil expenditure, state population, manufacturing, parent‟s 
education, poverty status, father‟s location in the home, African-American status, and 
born in the USA were included to determine if any or all were statistically significant.  
The purpose of structuring the process in this way allows model one to examine the 
contribution of the home factors to the distortion by using the African-American status, 
father‟s location in the home, parents level of education, and born in the USA as 
predictors.  Model two combines the factors contributed by the home with factors within 
the community that impact the educational progress of most students, poverty and 
occupational status, as measured by the manufacturing level.   
 The third model combines the home factors of model one of the African-
American status, father‟s location in the home, parents level of education, and born in the 
USA, the community factors of model two with poverty and manufacturing level, with 
the state factors of population and funding, as measured with the per pupil expenditures.  
At the conclusion of running all models a Hausman test was conducted in STATA and it 
supported the fixed effects model over the random effects.    
Table 4.5 illustrates the variables as well as their mean, max, min, and standard deviation.   
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Table 4.5 - Description of Variables 
 
Variable STATA Code Mean Min Max SD Predicted Impact 
 
State Assessment 
Growth 
png_hz_er_s -0.3755 -19.4237 0.951 2.504   
 
NAEP Assessment 
Growth 
png_hz_er_n -0.6929 -18.1243 0.9504 3.2938   
 
Discrepancy Index ch_png_hz_er 0.3174 -18.6839 18.1243 3.9891   
M
o
d
el
 O
n
e 
African-American 
Status 
black_hz 0 -1.4882 1.4977 0.8682 
Increased African-
American Status could 
increase discrepancy 
due to racial bias of 
tests. 
Parent's Level of 
Education 
school_hz 0 -1.4974 1.4193 0.8682 
Lower the level of 
Parent's Education 
may increase 
discrepancy. 
Born in the USA bp_hz 0 -1.4748 1.4858 0.8682 
Higher state 
population of 
immigrants may result 
in a higher 
discrepancy 
Father's Location in the 
Home 
dad_hz 0 -1.3663 1.4882 0.8682 
Fewer fathers at home 
could lead to a higher 
test discrepancy 
M
o
d
el
 T
w
o
 State's Level of 
Manufacturing 
manuf_hz 0 -1.4999 1.4994 0.8682 
Increased 
manufacturing could 
lead to a higher 
discrepancy 
Poverty Status poverty_hz 0 -1.4581 1.4983 0.8682 
Increased poverty may 
increase test 
discrepancy. 
M
o
d
el
 T
h
re
e
 Per Pupil Expenditure ppe_hz 0 -1.3305 1.4251 0.8682 
States with less 
funding may have a 
higher discrepancy 
State Population st_pop_hz 0 -1.4822 1.4997 0.8682 
Smaller states could 
have a higher 
discrepancy due to 
fewer resources and 
smaller testing pool. 
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In Appendix D there are scatter plots comparing each of the predictors above to the 
distortion index to illustrate the relationship each state has with each preditor.   
Elementary Reading Cheating Regression Models 
 Model One is designed to measure the impact of the home on test distortion 
between the state and NAEP assessments.  By combining the predictors contributed 
solely by the home; your race, whether or not your father lives with you, how educated 
your parents are, and if you are an immigrant, the goal of this model is to examine those 
characteristics to suggest possible impact on test distortion.  Out of the four predictors in 
this model, only one is statistically significant.  In Model One the predictor that is 
statistically significant is African-American status.  The coefficient of 1.7303 indicates 
that as the African-American status of a state increases so does the level of cheating on 
the elementary reading state assessment.  This finding can be explained by the research 
that black students score lower on standardized assessments than their white counterparts 
(Fryer & Levitt, 2006) resulting in the state‟s need to distort their progress in order to 
maintain their legitimacy and resources.  As the African-American status of a state 
increases, the state will also have an increase in African-American students in their 
schools.  This increase in students that do not perform as well on standardized 
assessments, coupled with the “one outcome fits all” mentality of No Child Left Behind, 
results in the state‟s need to produce the same outcomes as other states with students that 
perform at a higher level on standardized assessments. 
 In Model Two the home factors are combined with the community factors of 
poverty and manufacturing level to examine the impact of the community has on the 
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home factors of Model One.  Poverty is often viewed as the biggest contributor to student 
outcomes, as targeted in the LBJ War on Poverty with title funds.  According to Rury and 
Saatcioglu (2011), “the percent of adults holding manufacturing jobs is a measure of 
occupational status, and can be interpreted as reflecting the blue collar character of the 
total suburban or central city population in a given metro area.”  A state‟s level of 
manufacturing can also be used as a proxy to measure the occupational status of a state.  
The states with higher manufacturing, and by proxy higher occupational status, typically 
have more income, but less education.  Both predictors added in Model Two examine the 
impact a community can have on the predictors you get from home.   
 In Model Two only one predictor was statistically significant, African-American 
status, with a coefficient of 1.8224 indicating a more positive association with state level 
distortion than Model One of 1.7303.  The standard error did increase slightly from .7522 
to .7688.  This finding indicates the community factors of poverty and occupational status 
were not significant enough to overcome the home factors, specifically race.   
 In Model Three the predictors from home are combined with the predictors from 
the community and are added to those from the state by factoring in state population and 
the per pupil expenditures spent on education.  In this model, two predictors were 
statistically significant, race and state population.  African-American status increased its 
coefficient from 1.8224 to 2.0060, and lowered its p-value to .01.  The second 
statistically significant predictor in Model Three is the state‟s population.  The negative 
coefficient (-1.5967) indicates that cheating goes up as the state‟s population decreases.  
This finding could be explained by the limited resources of smaller states and the 
pressure to produce the same results as larger states.  The “one result fits all” in the form 
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of proficiency or higher on state assessments is the signature of No Child Left Behind.  
The institutional pressure the states feel to produce this result could manifest itself in the 
need to cheat to produce the same result of larger states.  Those states with limited 
resources are required to meet the same standard as the larger states, and with fewer 
advantages.  In addition to potentially fewer resources, there is less room for error within 
the testing pool of students.  In a large state, with a larger testing pool to draw for 
students, more students must pass, but more can fail and the state can still succeed.  In a 
smaller state, fewer students take the test, and as a result each one is more valuable to the 
overall success of the state.  This increased pressure created by a smaller testing pool 
could also result in the smaller states being force to cheat in order to maintain resources 
and legitimacy by incorporating institutional testing practices to produce the best result 
possible for their state.   
Table 4.6 - Elementary Reading Distortion Regression Models 
State Level Predictors Model One 
 
Model Two 
 
Model Three 
  Coeff. Std. Err. 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. 
 
Coeff. Std. Err. 
African-American Status 1.7303 0.7522 ** 
 
1.8224 0.7688 ** 
 
2.0060 0.8061 *** 
Father's Location in the Home 1.3366 1.0483   1.1820 1.1215   1.3355 1.1681  
Parent's Level of  Education 0.5182 1.2574   0.5916 1.3301   0.6535 1.3561  
Born in the USA -0.1754 0.6288   -0.1101 0.6432   -0.0626 0.6553  
Poverty Status     0.1262 0.6501   0.2092 0.6482  
State's Level of Manufacturing     0.4446 0.7795   0.4060 0.8194  
Per Pupil Expenditure         1.2051 1.3411  
State Population         -1.5967 .9225 * 
Constant 0.3510 0.3547 
  
0.3978 0.3647 
  
0.4935 0.4244   
R-Squared .0360 
   
.0369 
   
.0519 
 
  
Change in R-Squared 
    
.0009 
   
.0150 
 
  
F 2.07 
 
* 
 
1.45 
   
1.49 
    
          
  
*** Significant at 0.010. 
          
  
*** Significant at 0.050. 
          
  
*** Significant at 0.100.                       
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4.3 - Discussion of Results 
 When examining the distortion that occurs on the elementary reading assessments 
it is interesting to see different predictors statistically significant for the different 
assessments.  To explain the cheating on the elementary reading assessments the 
predictor of African-American status was statistically significant in all models indicating 
a strong finding that maintained as additional predictors were added to explain the 
distortion that occurs on high stakes assessments.  The African-American status 
illustrates conceptually a bias in both the standardized assessment and practices used to 
administer it to students.  The achievement gap between African-American students and 
others is well researched.  The state‟s need to circumvent that bias by manufacturing 
favorable results when more African-Americans are present represent bureaucratic 
policies aimed towards compensating for inefficiencies within a system.  
 The second statistically significant predictor, state population, suggests that 
smaller states distort their progress more than larger states.  This finding could be 
explained in several different ways.  It could be a function of the testing pool with 
smaller states being unable to absorb the range of student performance within the mean 
and as a result facilitating a system that distorts education progress more than larger 
states.  It could be a result of limited resources within smaller states to provide to 
education.  In most states over half of their state budget is spent on education, and smaller 
states would have less resources available to fund their educational systems.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I will summarize the findings of this dissertation, address potential 
concerns with the data, method, and section of predictors, as well as suggest potential 
directions for future research.   
5.1 Summary of Findings 
This dissertation addresses two research questions:   
1. Do states misrepresent their progress on their own state assessments? 
2.  If states do distort their progress, are their predictors to suggest why this 
distortion occurs? 
 The first research question requires that distortion be defined.  For the purposes of 
this dissertation I calculated the growth from 2003 to 2005, 2005 to 2007, and 2007 to 
2009 on each state‟s individual state assessment and the NAEP.  To calculate the growth 
I used a modified growth equation that subtracts the two scores and divides that by the 
maximum score on that test in that year, from the first score.  This calculation produces a 
Practical Normed Growth (PNG) for the state assessment as well as the NAEP.  To 
determine the distortion index I subtract the NAEP‟s PNG from the state assessment‟s 
PNG.  A positive distortion index indicates the state assessment‟s growth was greater 
than the NAEP‟s growth and the state cheated.  A negative distortion index indicates the 
NAEP‟s PNG was greater than the state assessment‟s PNG and the state did not 
misrepresent their progress.  This analysis was done on the elementary reading 
assessment.  This assessment includes three growth periods to compare, creates three 
observations of the 50 states, or 150 data points possible for distortion.   
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 The first research question, do states distort their progress?  The answer is yes.  
On the elementary reading assessments the states had a positive cheating index 76 times 
out of a possible 150, or 51%.  The observed distortions came from three basic models.  
First, the state assessment scores went up, but the NAEP scores went down or stayed the 
same.  Second, the state assessment scores stayed the same, but the NAEP scores went 
down.  Third, the state assessment scores went down, but the NAEP scores went down 
more.  In each of these possible scenarios the states have misrepresented the education 
progress of their state to their stakeholders.  In the first scenario, if the scores on the state 
assessments go up while the NAEP assessment scores go down indicates a narrowed 
curriculum and an overemphasis on the state assessment.  In the second scenario, if the 
scores on the state assessment stayed the same while the NAEP scores dropped indicates 
a less effective focus on the state assessment, at the expense of the NAEP.  The third 
scenario, both the state assessment and NAEP scores fall, with the NAEP scores falling 
faster indicates a state struggling to do anything well.   
 The second research question, are there predictors to suggest why this cheating 
occurs?  The answer is yes.  On the elementary reading assessment comparison, two 
predictors were statistically significant in the final model, state population and African-
American status.  The coefficients of each of these predictors indicate that states with 
lower populations and higher numbers of African-Americans distort their progress more 
on the elementary reading assessments.   
 The combination of the calculation to determine cheating, and the regression 
analysis to explain distortions, support the resource dependency and institutional theory 
outlined in the review of literature.  States in an effort to ensure resources have 
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ceremonially adopted state policies, curriculum, and testing practices to ensure those 
resources continue.  The accelerated growth on the state assessment demonstrates each 
state‟s commitment to the alignment of their stated public goal of reading proficiency in 
both middle and elementary schools.  The lack of growth on the NAEP assessment 
indicates those policies were adopted ceremonially and overall educational program has 
remained unchanged or regressed.  States have behaved like organization theory suggests, 
with the primary goal being survival.  The alignment to, and growth of, state assessment 
proficiency rates in both middle and elementary schools, combined with a stagnant or 
declining growth on the NAEP assessment, provide a powerful example of each state‟s 
willingness to do what is necessary to maintain their legitimacy and survive. 
5.2 Theory of Why States Distort their Results 
 As a result of the implementation of NCLB, there are at least two plausible 
theories to explain why states distort their results.  The first involves two agencies, the 
states and federal governments, working together to ceremonially adopt changes and 
manufacture progress to gain public trust to ensure survival.  The second involves the 
same two agencies competing against one another, and the state cheating in order to 
maintain resources and legitimacy.   
 In 2002, when NCLB was passed, the standard for success by 2014 allowed no 
room for error.  The intent of the reform was to eliminate the achievement gap between 
subgroups of students and restore the faith in public education damaged by the 1983 
Nation at Risk report.   In the first theory, the state and federal governments have the 
same goal, restore faith in public schools.  The federal government sets forth an 
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ambitious goal of complete proficiency and the states adopt timelines, curriculums, 
assessments, and policies ceremonially to meet the goal.  The federal government is a co-
conspirator who does not deliver any real accountability, only false promises of tough 
action with little or no follow through.  They allow the states to create and deliver less 
challenging assessments to enable the proficiency rates to grow quickly and restore 
public trust in public schools.  The state distorts their results, as demonstrated by the 
rapid growth of state assessment proficiency rates when compared to NAEP assessment 
scores, but the federal government looks the other way as the legitimacy of public 
schools is restored by the results they are able to produce on the state tests.   
 The second theory is that NCLB was a conservative attack to end public 
schooling in this country, and states have distorted their progress to survive.  One of the 
basic components of NCLB is the concept of choice.  As part of the reform if a student 
attends a school that does not make AYP, they are allowed to choose another school that 
did make AYP, with the home school paying the cost.  The theory of competition 
between schools for students resulting in a higher quality educational program is based 
market concept of competition creating quality and efficiency.  It is plausible to argue the 
reason NCLB received unilateral support at its inception, from both the right and left, is 
both sides viewed this as an opportunity to legitimize their belief in the role of public 
schools in America, with the conservative right seizing on the opportunity to take the first 
steps towards a voucher system.  If enough public schools were not able to make AYP, a 
logical next step would be to allow those students to choose a charter or private school 
option to meet their educational needs, in effect ending public education.  This high 
stakes attack on survival resulted in states cutting corners and doing whatever was 
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necessary to produce the results required by the reform to ensure the maintenance of 
resources and legitimacy.  In this theory the federal government is used to attack the 
legitimacy of public schools and push the country to a privatized system of education 
built on competition and results.        
5.3 Addressing Concerns 
Data 
 To obtain the state assessment data I had to go to each state‟s individual website 
and mine the data.  The lack of centralized location to obtain this state level data created 
some problems as some states were missing state assessment data.  Minnesota and New 
Hampshire did not have elementary or middle school reading levels for 2003 or 2005.  
New Mexico and Ohio did not have middle school reading data for 2003.   Rhode Island 
did not have elementary or middle school reading data for 2005.  Utah, Vermont, and 
West Virginia did not have elementary or middle school reading data for 2003.  To 
account for the missing data I matched it to the closest reported year the state did have 
data so that it reflected no progress.  The purpose of this study is to show the 
misrepresentation of progress at the state level, and filling in the missing data with the 
next data point established no gain.   
 In an ideal study each state would have all of the data for each year, but not all 
states published their data for the years of this study.  The NAEP data was mined from 
the NAEP Data Explorer in less than an hour.  The state assessment data required 
becoming familiar with each state‟s assessment, website, testing protocols, and reporting 
format.  This process took hundreds of hour and still was unable to produce a complete 
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data set.  However, when examining growth patterns it is my hope that filling in the 
missing data to show no growth does not diminish from the value or worth of the study. 
Method 
 The most complex task of this study is the standardization of the data to allow for 
interpretation.  When comparing proficiency percentages against test scores against eight 
different measures of predictors, the task of making sense of it all is a tall one.  To do this 
it was determined that every data point should be standardized to allow for comparison 
and easier interpretation.  To standardize any data point you must first determine the data 
set to calculate the mean and standard deviation.  With a mean and standard deviation the 
calculation is simple, but the theory behind creating the dataset is complex.  Three 
methods were discussed.  First, standardize each number by year.  For each data point 
compare it against how all fifty states did within a given year.  This would allow the 
standard error to be nested within a given year.  Second, standardize each number by 
state.  This would create a dataset for each variable by state, and standardize it based on 
how the state performed on each of the four observations.  This would allow the standard 
error to be nested within the state‟s characteristics.  Third, standardize each number by 
state and year.  This creates the largest dataset for each variable by allowing the 
standardization to occur over all fifty states in a four year span.  The second option was 
the one selected for this study, standardizing the data by state, with the rationale the state 
was the unit of study, not the year.  This study looks at the state‟s need to cheat to 
maintain resources and legitimacy, and the best way to do this would be to allow all the 
standard error to be nested within the state, allowing the full benefits of the panel data 
created.   
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Selection of Predictors 
 The second research question of this dissertation, are there predictors to explain 
why states cheat, is what makes this study unique.  The selection of the eight predictors; 
per pupil expenditure on education, state population, state‟s level of manufacturing, 
parents level of education, poverty status, father‟s location in the home, African-
American status, and immigrant status of a state were educated guesses at what variables 
could serve as predictors for why a state would need to cheat on their state assessments.  
There may be other predictors that could better explain the cheating outlined in this 
dissertation and those could be the basis of future research.  The variables selected 
explain only 5% of the distortion on the elementary reading assessments as indicated by 
the r-squared values of the final models.  Ideally this model would explain more of the 
distortion that occurs on state level testing progress when compared to the NAEP, and the 
selection of additional predictors could increase this value.   
5.4 Future Direction of Research 
 The foundation of this research creates several different possibilities for future 
research.  Those areas include examining the cut scores used by state to determine 
proficiency, the rigor of the state standards used to create the assessments, teacher 
licensure requirements, and additional predictors to explain the cheating that is outlined 
in this dissertation. 
Cut scores 
 The data obtained for this study regarding the state assessment was categorized by 
those students who scored proficient or higher on the elementary or middle school state 
assessment for reading.  Each state determines its standard for proficiency.  For example 
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in Kansas a student must score a 68% in reading to be classified as proficient, but only 
needs a 50% to be classified as proficient in math.  Another possible extension of this 
research could be to calculate the cheating index based on the proficiency data contained 
in this dissertation combined with the cut score needed to be classified as proficient.  
With each state determining the cut score needed to be classified as proficient, and 
Campbell‟s Law telling us “the more any quantitative social indicator is used for social 
decision making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it 
will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it was intended to monitor,” it is likely 
states may be using the arbitrary classification of proficiency as a way to cheat.  The 
combination of the percentage of students classified as proficient, coupled with the cut 
score needed to meet that classification, could serve as a powerful indicator of the 
cheating that occurs at the state level. 
State Standard Rigor 
 Each state determines its own standards for reading and math.  The state 
assessments administered by the state are built on those state standards.  The rigor of 
those standards determines the difficulty of the state assessment.  Multiple researcher 
studies (Bandeira de Mello, Blankenship, McLaughlin (2009), Schneider (2009), 
Stoneberg (2007)) have been done to examine the rigor of the standards used to develop 
state assessments.  An extension of this dissertation could be to couple the rigor of state 
standards to the cheating that occurs at the state level.  Do states with more rigorous 
standards cheat more or less?  Do states that cheat more have more rigorous standards 
cheat more or less?  Do states that have less rigorous standards cheat more or less?  These 
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are some possible topics that could explored with state level cheating tied to standard 
rigor.   
Teacher Licensure 
 Under No Child Left Behind each state determines the criteria for a teacher to be 
considered “highly qualified.”  Some states require a college degree in education; some 
require a standardized exam in their content area, others in professional practice.  Some 
states have alternative licensure programs, others do not.  All states have licensing 
requirements that could be used as predictors for teacher quality.  The quality of teachers 
a state has in its education system could be linked to the state‟s need to cheat.  Another 
possible research study could examine a state‟s cheating index in combination with the 
requirements to teach in that state.  Do states with lower teacher quality cheat more or 
less?  Does the state have to compensate for an inadequate teaching force by cheating?  
These are topics that could be explored in future studies based on this research. 
Additional Variables as Predictors 
 In this study the two different assessments, elementary and middle school reading, 
had different predictors for cheating.  This finding suggests a possible topic for future 
research based on the emphasis of assessment and the curriculum at the different levels of 
education, and how this change in emphasis could lead to cheating.  The complexity of 
the cheating outlined in this dissertation could not be captured within the eight variables 
used within this study.  Other possible predictors could be the addition of proxies aimed 
at measuring the impact of the home structure on the state‟s need to compensate by 
cheating.  Examples include the mother‟s location in the home, number of siblings, hours 
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the parents work per week, and other factors demonstrated to have an impact on how a 
student typically performs in school.   
 As a policy study, this dissertation only looked at per citizen expenditure as the 
funding predictor for cheating.  Additional variables could be explored to better tell the 
story of cheating that occurs in states.  Possible variables could the amount of money 
spent on special education, title funds received by the state per student, or other targeted 
funds aimed at improving the educational opportunity of those students needing 
additional support outside the general education spectrum.   
   In addition, future studies could look at state and NAEP math cheating indexes 
to determine if similar predictors apply to the cheating that occurs on those assessments.  
A frequent topic in education circles is the quality and abundance of math and science 
teachers.  Many states typically score lower on their NAEP and state math assessments, 
do these lower scores indicate more or less cheating?  Has the perception of lower teacher 
quality in math and science forced states to cheat more?  These are possible topics for 
future studies based on the foundation established in this dissertation.   
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APPENDIX A 
STATA Printouts of Cheating Regression Models 
 
. xi: xtreg ch_png_hz_er  school_hz  dad_hz black_hz bp_hz , i(statenum) fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       150 
Group variable: statenum                        Number of groups   =        50 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0794                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0028                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.0360                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(4,96)            =      2.07 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1524                        Prob > F           =    0.0908 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ch_png_hz_er |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   school_hz |   .5182599   1.257447     0.41   0.681    -1.977752    3.014272 
      dad_hz |   1.336655   1.048386     1.27   0.205    -.7443737    3.417684 
    black_hz |   1.730326    .752274     2.30   0.024      .237074    3.223578 
       bp_hz |  -.1754249   .6288745    -0.28   0.781    -1.423731    1.072881 
       _cons |   .3510334   .3547292     0.99   0.325    -.3530985    1.055165 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.2642732 
     sigma_e |  4.0174014 
         rho |  .24108085   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(49, 96) =     0.92              Prob > F = 0.6272 
 
. xi: xtreg ch_png_hz_er  manuf_hz school_hz poverty_hz dad_hz black_hz bp_hz , 
i(statenum) fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       150 
Group variable: statenum                        Number of groups   =        50 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.0845                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0032                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.0369                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(6,94)            =      1.45 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1685                        Prob > F           =    0.2057 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ch_png_hz_er |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    manuf_hz |   .4446202   .7795305     0.57   0.570    -1.103156    1.992396 
   school_hz |    .591623   1.330175     0.44   0.658    -2.049471    3.232717 
  poverty_hz |   .1262143   .6501807     0.19   0.846    -1.164735    1.417163 
      dad_hz |   1.182043   1.121597     1.05   0.295    -1.044914       3.409 
    black_hz |   1.822449   .7688497     2.37   0.020     .2958799    3.349018 
       bp_hz |  -.1101685   .6432659    -0.17   0.864    -1.387388    1.167051 
       _cons |   .3978872   .3647916     1.09   0.278     -.326415    1.122189 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.2801599 
     sigma_e |  4.0486809 
         rho |  .24080136   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(49, 94) =     0.91              Prob > F = 0.6407 
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. xi: xtreg ch_png_hz_er  st_pop_hz manuf_hz school_hz poverty_hz dad_hz black_hz bp_hz 
ppe_hz , i(statenum) fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       150 
Group variable: statenum                        Number of groups   =        50 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1144                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0015                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.0519                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(8,92)            =      1.49 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1939                        Prob > F           =    0.1733 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ch_png_hz_er |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   st_pop_hz |  -1.596762   .9225054    -1.73   0.087    -3.428937    .2354135 
    manuf_hz |    .406041   .8194533     0.50   0.621    -1.221464    2.033546 
   school_hz |   .6535592   1.356107     0.48   0.631    -2.039786    3.346904 
  poverty_hz |   .2092734   .6482187     0.32   0.748    -1.078145    1.496692 
      dad_hz |    1.33556    1.16816     1.14   0.256    -.9845074    3.655628 
    black_hz |   2.006099   .8061815     2.49   0.015     .4049531    3.607245 
       bp_hz |   -.062695   .6553324    -0.10   0.924    -1.364242    1.238852 
      ppe_hz |   1.205118   1.341107     0.90   0.371    -1.458437    3.868672 
       _cons |   .4935275   .4244248     1.16   0.248    -.3494168    1.336472 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.3138886 
     sigma_e |  4.0250176 
         rho |  .24839334   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(49, 92) =     0.90              Prob > F = 0.6604 
 
xi: xtreg ch_png_hz_er  st_pop_hz manuf_hz school_hz poverty_hz dad_hz black_hz bp_hz 
ppe_hz i.year, i(statenum) fe 
i.year            _Iyear_2003-2009    (naturally coded; _Iyear_2003 omitted) 
note: _Iyear_2009 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       150 
Group variable: statenum                        Number of groups   =        50 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1681                         Obs per group: min =         3 
       between = 0.0054                                        avg =       3.0 
       overall = 0.1044                                        max =         3 
 
                                                F(10,90)           =      1.82 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1237                        Prob > F           =    0.0684 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ch_png_hz_er |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   st_pop_hz |  -2.037217   .9222669    -2.21   0.030    -3.869461   -.2049727 
    manuf_hz |   1.116114   .8554784     1.30   0.195    -.5834431    2.815671 
   school_hz |   .5730169   1.366165     0.42   0.676    -2.141109    3.287142 
  poverty_hz |   .0994065   .6683017     0.15   0.882    -1.228291    1.427104 
      dad_hz |   1.034643   1.200483     0.86   0.391    -1.350326    3.419612 
    black_hz |   1.659551   .8171379     2.03   0.045     .0361642    3.282938 
       bp_hz |  -.3682929   .6571598    -0.56   0.577    -1.673855    .9372697 
      ppe_hz |  -1.293108   2.363061    -0.55   0.586    -5.987741    3.401526 
 _Iyear_2005 |  -6.578347   5.177365    -1.27   0.207    -16.86409    3.707392 
 _Iyear_2007 |  -4.363207   2.282684    -1.91   0.059    -8.898156    .1717428 
 _Iyear_2009 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |   5.297553   3.417122     1.55   0.125    -1.491156    12.08626 
76 
 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.2356262 
     sigma_e |   3.944149 
         rho |  .24316156   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(49, 90) =     0.86              Prob > F = 0.7097 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Middle School Reading 
 
State Assessment Scores NAEP Assessement Scores 
State 2003 2005 2007 2009 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Alabama 51 68 71 75 253 252 252 255 
Alaska 67 79 85 81 256 259 259 259 
Arizona 56 63 63 69 255 255 255 258 
Arkansas 52 58 64 70 258 258 258 258 
California 65 72 73 79 251 250 251 253 
Colorado 88 64 63 64 268 265 266 266 
Connecticut 76 76 76 77 267 264 267 272 
Delaware 69 78 82 81 265 266 265 265 
Florida 49 44 49 54 257 256 260 264 
Georgia 81 83 89 96 258 257 259 260 
Hawaii 38 37 59 68 251 249 251 255 
Idaho 34 82 86 92 264 264 265 265 
Illinois 65 74 83 83 266 264 263 265 
Indiana 65 67 67 68 265 261 264 266 
Iowa 69 71 73 74 268 267 267 265 
Kansas 70 76 78 84 266 267 267 267 
Kentucky 57 61 66 65 266 264 262 267 
Louisiana 52 62 56 62 253 253 253 253 
Maine 45 44 65 71 268 270 270 268 
Maryland 59 66 67 81 262 261 265 267 
Massachusetts 66 66 69 70 273 274 273 274 
Michigan 61 72 77 83 264 261 260 262 
Minnesota 63 63 63 66 268 268 268 270 
Mississippi 61 56 80 49 255 251 250 251 
Missouri 32 32 42 50 267 265 263 267 
Montana 70 64 79 81 270 269 271 270 
Nebraska 76 85 89 95 266 267 267 267 
Nevada 49 50 56 60 252 253 252 254 
New Hampshire 66 66 66 77 271 270 270 271 
New Jersey 73 72 73 81 268 269 270 273 
New Mexico 51 51 55 62 252 251 251 254 
New York 45 48 57 69 265 265 264 264 
North Carolina 85 87 87 66 262 258 259 260 
North Dakota 78 79 79 74 270 270 268 269 
Ohio 78 78 80 72 267 267 268 269 
Oklahoma 79 81 79 67 262 260 260 259 
Oregon 61 63 66 69 264 263 266 265 
Pennsylvania 63 64 75 82 264 267 268 271 
Rhode Island 40 59 59 64 261 261 258 260 
South Carolina 66 74 71 67 258 257 257 257 
South Dakota 78 79 78 74 270 269 270 270 
Tennessee 84 86 92 92 258 259 259 261 
Texas 83 82 89 93 259 258 261 260 
Utah 75 75 79 81 264 262 262 266 
Vermont 65 65 68 74 271 269 273 272 
Virginia 53 53 49 45 268 268 267 266 
Washington 47 69 68 59 264 265 265 267 
West Virginia 80 80 80 61 260 255 255 255 
Wisconsin 79 84 84 83 266 266 264 266 
Wyoming 39 39 75 64 267 268 266 268 
Missing Scores 
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APPENDIX C 
  Elementary School Reading 
  State Assessment Scores NAEP Assessement Scores 
State 2003 2005 2007 2009 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Alabama 53 83 84 87 207 208 216 216 
Alaska 73 78 79 78 212 211 214 211 
Arizona 57 67 70 73 209 207 210 210 
Arkansas 61 52 60 70 214 217 217 216 
California 71 75 77 83 206 207 209 210 
Colorado 87 69 68 69 224 224 224 226 
Connecticut 68 68 71 70 228 226 227 229 
Delaware 79 84 81 81 224 226 225 226 
Florida 63 67 69 71 218 219 224 226 
Georgia 90 92 85 93 214 214 219 218 
Hawaii 42 51 61 62 208 210 213 211 
Idaho 87 84 81 87 218 222 223 221 
Illinois 63 68 74 73 216 216 219 219 
Indiana 73 75 74 75 220 218 222 223 
Iowa 70 79 80 81 223 221 225 221 
Kansas 68 76 80 83 220 220 225 224 
Kentucky 62 68 72 74 219 220 222 226 
Louisiana 58 52 58 71 205 209 207 207 
Maine 49 53 67 71 224 225 226 224 
Maryland 75 81 85 86 219 220 225 226 
Massachusetts 56 50 55 53 228 231 236 234 
Michigan 75 83 84 84 219 218 220 218 
Minnesota 71 71 71 74 223 225 225 223 
Mississippi 88 88 95 52 205 204 208 211 
Missouri 34 35 46 47 222 221 221 224 
Montana 76 75 80 81 223 225 227 225 
Nebraska 78 84 89 94 221 221 223 223 
Nevada 43 42 51 50 207 207 211 211 
New Hampshire 75 75 75 78 228 227 229 229 
New Jersey 77 81 80 63 225 223 231 229 
New Mexico 51 51 54 51 203 207 212 208 
New York 64 70 68 77 222 223 224 224 
North Carolina 81 82 85 69 221 217 218 219 
North Dakota 85 87 89 77 222 225 226 226 
Ohio 66 76 80 82 222 223 226 225 
Oklahoma 63 91 90 63 214 214 217 217 
Oregon 80 82 71 76 218 217 215 218 
Pennsylvania 58 63 70 73 219 223 226 224 
Rhode Island 61 63 63 68 216 216 219 223 
South Carolina 76 79 82 75 215 213 214 216 
South Dakota 85 87 88 77 222 222 223 222 
Tennessee 84 87 87 90 212 214 216 217 
Texas 81 79 84 84 215 219 220 219 
Utah 76 76 77 77 219 221 221 219 
Vermont 69 69 68 69 226 227 228 229 
Virginia 63 56 51 54 223 226 227 227 
Washington 66 79 76 73 221 223 224 221 
West Virginia 81 81 83 64 219 215 215 215 
Wisconsin 82 82 81 81 221 221 223 220 
Wyoming 44 47 75 63 222 223 225 223 
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